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ecohealth_alliance [2022/08/13 15:35]
pamela [References] 		ecohealth_alliance [2023/05/08 21:16] (current)
liam [Link Dump]
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 =====Connection with Wuhan Institute of Virology===== =====Connection with Wuhan Institute of Virology=====
  
-EcoHealth Alliance Inc funded work by [[:Shi Zheng-Li]] at the [[Wuhan Institute of Virology]] leading to a 2013 paper in Nature which describes the collection and isolation of a SARS-like coronavirus (SL-CoV) named WIV1. This was the first SL-CoV isolated directly from Chinese horseshoe bats (//Rhinolophus sinicus//)which was able to use [[Angiotensin Converting Enzyme 2|ACE2]] of different origins as an entry receptor and replicated efficiently in the ACE2-expressing cells.+EcoHealth Alliance Inc funded work by [[:Shi Zheng-Li]] at the [[:Wuhan Institute of Virology]] leading to a 2013 paper in Nature which describes the collection and isolation of a SARS-like coronavirus (SL-CoV) named WIV1. This was the first SL-CoV isolated directly from Chinese horseshoe bats (//Rhinolophus sinicus//)which was able to use [[Angiotensin Converting Enzyme 2|ACE2]] of different origins as an entry receptor and replicated efficiently in the ACE2-expressing cells.
  
  
 ===EcoHealth Propaganda Science=== ===EcoHealth Propaganda Science===
  
-In late October, House Republican investigators released details about the National Institutes of Health inadequate oversight of grants that NIH provided to the EcoHealth Alliance. These details arose from a bipartisan “in camera” review of documents conducted at the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) that was monitored by HHS staff. (For science writers, in camera review means the documents were examined in chambers. In this case, because the NIH refuses to make the documents public.)+In late October, House Republican investigators released details about the [[:National Institutes of Health]] inadequate oversight of grants that NIH provided to the EcoHealth Alliance. These details arose from a bipartisan “in camera” review of documents conducted at the Department of [[:Health and Human Services]] (HHS) that was monitored by HHS staff. (For science writers, in camera review means the documents were examined in chambers. In this case, because the NIH refuses to make the documents public.)
  
 The review((https://disinformationchronicle.substack.com/p/pursued-on-all-sides-by-journalists)) found; The review((https://disinformationchronicle.substack.com/p/pursued-on-all-sides-by-journalists)) found;
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 ===Potential CIA Links=== ===Potential CIA Links===
-//"EcoHealth Alliance received the majority of its funding from the [[:United States Agency for International Development]] (USAID), a State Department subsidiary that serves as a frequent cover for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Their second largest source of funding was from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), which is a branch of the Department of Defense (DOD) which states it is tasked to “counter and deter weapons of mass destruction and improvised threat networks."+//"EcoHealth Alliance received the majority of its funding from the United States Agency for International Development [[:USAID]], a State Department subsidiary that serves as a frequent cover for the Central Intelligence Agency [[:CIA]]. Their second largest source of funding was from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency [[:DTRA]], which is a branch of the [[:Department of Defense]] (DOD) which states it is tasked to “counter and deter **weapons of mass destruction** and improvised threat networks."
 //((https://kanekoa.substack.com/p/was-peter-daszak-working-for-the)) //((https://kanekoa.substack.com/p/was-peter-daszak-working-for-the))
  
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 Dr. Karesh has pioneered initiatives focusing attention and resources on solving problems created by the interactions among wildlife, people, and their animals.  In 2003, he coined the term “One Health” to describe the interdependence of healthy ecosystems, animals and people and the term has been adopted by many organizations, including the United Nations and the [[:World Bank]], in local and global health efforts.  Dr. Karesh has created dozens of initiatives to encourage linkages among public health, agriculture and environmental health agencies and organizations around the world.  He has personally lead programs and projects in over 45 countries, covering terrain from Argentina to Zambia. ((https://www.aspeninstitute.org/our-people/william-karesh/)) Dr. Karesh has pioneered initiatives focusing attention and resources on solving problems created by the interactions among wildlife, people, and their animals.  In 2003, he coined the term “One Health” to describe the interdependence of healthy ecosystems, animals and people and the term has been adopted by many organizations, including the United Nations and the [[:World Bank]], in local and global health efforts.  Dr. Karesh has created dozens of initiatives to encourage linkages among public health, agriculture and environmental health agencies and organizations around the world.  He has personally lead programs and projects in over 45 countries, covering terrain from Argentina to Zambia. ((https://www.aspeninstitute.org/our-people/william-karesh/))
  
-[[:Aspen Strategy Group]] is a policy program concentrating on strategic relations and arms control issues. Notable members with prominent warmongers and NeoCons - Joseph Samuel Nye, Jr., Brent Scowcroft, Madeleine Albright, Richard Armitage, Robert Kagan, Nicholas D. Kristof,Richard G. Lugar, Susan Rice, Anne-Marie Slaughter, Strobe Talbott ((https://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php/Aspen_Institute_/_Aspen_Strategy_Group#Aspen_Strategy_Group_Members))((https://web.archive.org/web/20220130202327/https://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php/Aspen_Institute_/_Aspen_Strategy_Group#cite_note-HealthPR-1))+[[:Aspen Institute]] Strategy Group is a policy program concentrating on strategic relations and arms control issues. Notable members with prominent warmongers and NeoCons - Joseph Samuel Nye, Jr., [[:Brent Scowcroft]], [[:Madeleine Albright]], [[:Richard Armitage]], [[:Robert Kagan]], [[:Nicholas D. Kristof]], [[:Richard G. Lugar]], [[:Susan Rice]], [[:Anne-Marie Slaughter]], [[:Strobe Talbott]] ((https://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php/Aspen_Institute_/_Aspen_Strategy_Group#Aspen_Strategy_Group_Members))((https://web.archive.org/web/20220130202327/https://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php/Aspen_Institute_/_Aspen_Strategy_Group#cite_note-HealthPR-1))
  
-In January 2008, Aspen announced that former New Jersey governor turned PR executive Christine Todd Whitman; U.S. [[:Centers for Disease Control]] and Prevention director [[:Julie Gerberding]], and [[:GE Healthcare]] president and CEO Joseph Hogan would co-chair the health project. +In January 2008, Aspen announced that former New Jersey governor turned PR executive [[:Christine Todd Whitman]]; U.S. [[:Centers for Disease Control]] and Prevention director [[:Julie Gerberding]], and [[:GE Healthcare]] president and CEO Joseph Hogan would co-chair the health project. 
  
 "They join Mark Ganz, president and CEO of Regence [[:Blue Cross Blue Shield]], in leading the new project to help transform health care," stated an Aspen press release.((https://web.archive.org/web/20111121011754/http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/christine-todd-whitman-julie-gerberding-and-joseph-hogan-join-mark-ganz-to-lead-aspen-institute-health-stewardship-project-56898037.html)) "They join Mark Ganz, president and CEO of Regence [[:Blue Cross Blue Shield]], in leading the new project to help transform health care," stated an Aspen press release.((https://web.archive.org/web/20111121011754/http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/christine-todd-whitman-julie-gerberding-and-joseph-hogan-join-mark-ganz-to-lead-aspen-institute-health-stewardship-project-56898037.html))
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 This [[:gain-of-function]] experiment, which had begun prior to the moratorium, was so fraught that the authors flagged the dangers themselves, writing, “scientific review panels may deem similar studies…too risky to pursue.” The paper’s acknowledgments cited funding from the NIH and from EcoHealth Alliance, through a different grant. This [[:gain-of-function]] experiment, which had begun prior to the moratorium, was so fraught that the authors flagged the dangers themselves, writing, “scientific review panels may deem similar studies…too risky to pursue.” The paper’s acknowledgments cited funding from the NIH and from EcoHealth Alliance, through a different grant.
  
-If anything, the [[:MERS]] study Daszak proposed was even riskier. So he pitched a compromise to the NIH: that if any of the recombined strains showed 10 times greater growth than a natural virus, “we will immediately: i) stop all experiments with the mutant, ii) inform our NIAID Program Officer and the UNC [Institutional Biosafety Committee] of these results and iii) participate in decision making trees to decide appropriate paths forward.”+If anything, the [[:MERS]] study Daszak proposed was even riskier. So he pitched a compromise to the NIH: that if any of the recombined strains showed 10 times greater growth than a natural virus, “we will immediately: i) stop all experiments with the mutant, ii) inform our [[:NIAID]] Program Officer and the UNC [[:Institutional Biosafety Committee] of these results and iii) participate in decision making trees to decide appropriate paths forward.”
  
 This mention of UNC brought a puzzled response from an NIH program officer, who pointed out that the proposal had said the research would be performed at the WIV. “Can you clarify where the work with the chimeric viruses will actually be performed?” the officer wrote. Ten days later, with still no response from Daszak, the program officer emailed him again. On June 27, Daszak responded, buoyant as ever; This mention of UNC brought a puzzled response from an NIH program officer, who pointed out that the proposal had said the research would be performed at the WIV. “Can you clarify where the work with the chimeric viruses will actually be performed?” the officer wrote. Ten days later, with still no response from Daszak, the program officer emailed him again. On June 27, Daszak responded, buoyant as ever;
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 Documents Show Texas Researcher Warned Wuhan Lab of COVID Investigation by Congress Documents Show Texas Researcher Warned Wuhan Lab of COVID Investigation by Congress
  
-Judicial Watch announced today that it obtained 412 pages of new records that show the former director of the Galveston National Laboratory at the University of Texas Medical Branch (UTMB), Dr. James W. Le Duc warned Chinese researchers at the Wuhan Institute of Virology of potential investigations into the covid issue by Congress.+Judicial Watch announced today that it obtained 412 pages of new records that show the former director of the [[:Galveston National Laboratory]] at the University of Texas Medical Branch (UTMB), Dr. James W. Le Duc warned Chinese researchers at the Wuhan Institute of Virology of potential investigations into the covid issue by Congress.
  
 Additionally, the documents show Le Duc praising the Wuhan researchers and Chinese officials for their transparency and handling of the COVID-19 outbreak, and, in April 2021, Le Duc accepting a request to be on the Biosafety Advisory Committee of Westlake University in Hangzhou, China.  (James Le Duc, PhD, is the director of the [[:Galveston National Laboratory]], one of the largest active biocontainment facilities on a U.S. academic campus.) Additionally, the documents show Le Duc praising the Wuhan researchers and Chinese officials for their transparency and handling of the COVID-19 outbreak, and, in April 2021, Le Duc accepting a request to be on the Biosafety Advisory Committee of Westlake University in Hangzhou, China.  (James Le Duc, PhD, is the director of the [[:Galveston National Laboratory]], one of the largest active biocontainment facilities on a U.S. academic campus.)
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 A February 9, 2020, email from Le Duc prepares Zhiming with questions that may arise in an investigation of the origins of the COVID-19 virus. Le Duc warns that questions about the virus originating from the Wuhan Institute of Virology initially came only from social media, but had recently expanded to “alternate information sources,” “senior officials” and “reputable newspapers” all linking the opening of the ABSL 4 facility at the as the source of the virus outbreak. A February 9, 2020, email from Le Duc prepares Zhiming with questions that may arise in an investigation of the origins of the COVID-19 virus. Le Duc warns that questions about the virus originating from the Wuhan Institute of Virology initially came only from social media, but had recently expanded to “alternate information sources,” “senior officials” and “reputable newspapers” all linking the opening of the ABSL 4 facility at the as the source of the virus outbreak.
  
-In an email dated May 6, 2019, Le Duc thanks the National Institutes of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) regional program officer for Global Research for East/South Asia and Pacific Gale Bernabe for taking his call to discuss “possible funding sources for collaborative work with China.”+In an email dated May 6, 2019, Le Duc thanks the National Institutes of Allergy and Infectious Diseases [[:NIAID]] regional program officer for Global Research for East/South Asia and Pacific Gale Bernabe for taking his call to discuss “possible funding sources for collaborative work with China.”
  
 Le Duc informs Bernabe about a proposal to begin work in Wuhan later in the year. Le Duc informs Bernabe about a proposal to begin work in Wuhan later in the year.
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 Le Duc informs Zhiming that his paper was “nicely written” concerning biocontainment labs in China, however, the paper should be expanded “to let readers know that security is an important aspect of your program.” Le Duc informs Zhiming that his paper was “nicely written” concerning biocontainment labs in China, however, the paper should be expanded “to let readers know that security is an important aspect of your program.”
  
-In an email dated January 16, 2020, Le Duc congratulates Dr. George F. Gao, director-general of the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention (China CDC), on his leadership and China’s response to COVID-19. Le Duc includes two articles of interest and further states:+In an email dated January 16, 2020, Le Duc congratulates Dr. [[:George F. Gao]], director-general of the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention (China CDC), on his leadership and China’s response to COVID-19. Le Duc includes two articles of interest and further states:
  
 As you might expect, we are following the evolving story on nCoV from Wuhan very closely and we are eager to get an isolate for antiviral testing. Dr Tseng’s [https://microbiology.utmb.edu/faculty/chien-te-(kent)-tseng-phd] lab here in the GNL [Galveston National Laboratory] has developed a transgenic mouse model for SARS that is very useful and we are anxious to see if it can be used for the nCoV [novel coronavirus] as well. As you might expect, we are following the evolving story on nCoV from Wuhan very closely and we are eager to get an isolate for antiviral testing. Dr Tseng’s [https://microbiology.utmb.edu/faculty/chien-te-(kent)-tseng-phd] lab here in the GNL [Galveston National Laboratory] has developed a transgenic mouse model for SARS that is very useful and we are anxious to see if it can be used for the nCoV [novel coronavirus] as well.
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 Le Duc informs Zhiming that the U.S. was at the start of the “explosion of cases in our region and over the next few weeks we would see very high numbers of cases requiring hospitalizations and ICU support,” and suggests that “it would be excellent if we could identify areas for collaborations.” Le Duc informs Zhiming that the U.S. was at the start of the “explosion of cases in our region and over the next few weeks we would see very high numbers of cases requiring hospitalizations and ICU support,” and suggests that “it would be excellent if we could identify areas for collaborations.”
  
-In an April 29, 2020, email, NIAID Associate Director for International Research Affairs Gray Handley informs Le Duc of an inquiry from U.S. Embassy in Beijing, “asking what was the official name of your DoD supported training program and some other background information.,,, Also, can you assure these responses to their questions are accurate?”+In an April 29, 2020, email, [[:NIAID]] Associate Director for International Research Affairs Gray Handley informs Le Duc of an inquiry from U.S. Embassy in Beijing, “asking what was the official name of your DoD supported training program and some other background information.,,, Also, can you assure these responses to their questions are accurate?”
  
 To the question: “Did this training take place in the U.S., China, or in both countries?” Handley writes that since 2013, the Galveston National Laboratory, UTMB, was “part of the NIH Biodefense Laboratory Network [and] provided laboratory safety and security training for high-level biocontainment facilities in China, including the Wuhan Institute of Virology.” To the question: “Did this training take place in the U.S., China, or in both countries?” Handley writes that since 2013, the Galveston National Laboratory, UTMB, was “part of the NIH Biodefense Laboratory Network [and] provided laboratory safety and security training for high-level biocontainment facilities in China, including the Wuhan Institute of Virology.”
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 {{ ::ecohealth_sars_grants.png?800 |}} {{ ::ecohealth_sars_grants.png?800 |}}
  
-===== Link Dump ===== 
  
 +====  Risk-Zoonotic-Virus-Hotspots-Grant-Notice ====
 +((https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/21055988-risk-zoonotic-virus-hotspots-grant-notice))
 +{{ ::ecohealth_grant_2025.png?600|}}
 +===== Link Dump =====
  
 +  * [[https://www.ecohealthalliance.org/2023/05/collaborative-research-to-understand-the-risk-of-bat-coronavirus-spillover-emergence|EcoHealth Alliance Receives NIH Renewal Grant for Collaborative Research to Understand the Risk of Bat Coronavirus Spillover Emergence]]
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